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Abstract 
 
Recessions lead to short-term job loss, lower levels of happiness and decreasing income 
levels. There is growing evidence that workers who first join the labor market during 
economic downturns suffer from poor job matches that can have a sustained detrimental 
effect on their wages and career progression. This paper uses a range of US and UK data to 
document a more disturbing long-run effect of recessions: young people who leave school in 
the midst of recessions are significantly more likely to lead a life of crime than those entering 
a buoyant labor market. Thus crime scars resulting from higher entry level unemployment 
rates prove to be both long lasting and substantial. 
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1. Introduction 
Do the labor market conditions the young encounter when first leaving school play a role in 
initiating and forming criminal careers? Think of two otherwise identical school leavers who 
left high school in 2010 – one in North Dakota, the other in Michigan. Both have completed 
education and try to get a job. But the North Dakota school leaver faced a state 
unemployment rate of only 3.8 percent, while it was 12.7 percent in Michigan. At the margin, 
the Michigan youngster is more likely to proceed down the wrong path – no luck getting a 
job, no welfare to fall back on, hanging out with similarly unfortunate juveniles, trouble with 
the police, some petty larceny and so on – than the North Dakota youngster. Indeed this is 
just the standard Becker (1968) model in action. As youths leave school, they face a trade-off 
between legal and illegal activities. At higher unemployment rates, the expected returns to 
legal activity (i.e. work) are lower. All else equal, this encourages some youths to commit 
crime who would otherwise have avoided such a result in a more buoyant labor market.  
But what might happen as these same youngsters age? Two obvious mechanisms link 
their experience straight out of high school with later ones. First, earlier experiences of crime 
can increase their stock of criminal knowledge and potentially reduce the costs of subsequent 
crime participation. Second, a previous criminal record (and less on-the-job human capital 
accumulation) may reduce the expected wage in the legal labor market. Both can be expected 
to increase the likelihood that the individual eventually ends up becoming a career criminal. 
There is a substantial body of criminological evidence that points to the importance of 
the experience of youths for understanding crime patterns. Almost two hundred years ago, 
Adolphe Quetelet showed that crime in early nineteenth-century France peaked when 
individuals were in their late teens (Quetelet, 1831). Subsequent research has confirmed the 
strong age-crime pattern, with crime peaking in the late teens and declining with age quite 
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rapidly.
1
 Unsurprisingly in our data, the same patterns emerge.
2
 The peak is at age 17 or 18 
and then declines reasonably smoothly. However, it is still the case that the offender rate at 
age 29 is a lot higher than at age 39 – showing criminality to be not just a feature of teenage 
years.  
Existing evidence also points to strong links between criminality in teenage years and 
subsequent criminal behavior.
3
 In our data for example, 72 percent of males aged over 25 in 
the UK who were convicted of a crime in 2002 had a criminal record that went back to their 
teenage years. Thus, factors that increase criminal behavior for juveniles have scope to raise 
the lifetime criminal participation rate. The focus of this paper is whether the state of the 
labor market at entry is such a factor. 
In pursuing this research question, our analysis contributes to two distinct strands of 
literature. First, there has been an extensive, though partly unresolved, debate over the link 
between recessions and crime, studying whether crime rates, and in particular property crime 
rates, are countercyclical. The place where one can identify effects of unemployment on 
crime is for young adults.
4
 Thus, Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002) examine the impact 
of contemporaneous unemployment and wages on the criminal behavior of less educated 
young males. Exploiting a panel of US counties, they find significant effects for both wages 
and unemployment on property and violent crime. Fougère et al. (2009) find strong effects 
from youth unemployment (but not overall unemployment) on crime in France, while 
                                                 
1
 See Hirschi and Gottfredson (1983) for the development of the formulation that crime-age profiles are 
invariant over time and space, and the subsequent body of research trying to refute this claim that followed (for 
example, Greenberg, 1985, Hansen, 2003, and the meta-study of Pratt and Cullen, 2000). 
2
 Figure A1 in the Appendix plots the average male offender rate by age for the US and UK from 2000-2010. 
Full details on the data used in the chart are provided in Section 4 and the Data Appendix. The chart shows the 
average offender rate (arrested in US and convicted in UK), defined as the number of offenders in each age 
group divided by population in each age group. The data is averaged over the period 2000-2010. 
3
 See the many papers cited in the review of Nagin and Paternoster (2000) which frames the positive link at the 
individual level between past and future criminality in terms of individual heterogeneity and state dependence. 
4
 Indeed, Freeman’s (1999) survey notes the relationship across the whole population to be ‘fragile, at best’. 
More recent reviews confirm this and therefore more focus can be placed on youth crime and unemployment to 
see labor market effects on crime (for example, see Mustard, 2010, and Buonnano et al., 2011). 
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Grönqvist (2013) uses Swedish register data to uncover a strong and precisely estimated link 
between youth unemployment and crime, both for property and violent crimes.  
Second, there is a growing literature on the effects of first entering the labor market 
during recessions on outcomes later in life. That literature so far has focused on whether such 
workers experience sustained long-run negative consequences. Early contributions by 
Ellwood (1982) and Gardecki and Neumark (1998) found somewhat contrasting evidence on 
whether initial labor market experience affected subsequent outcomes, with Ellwood finding 
significant effects on wages but not on future spells of unemployment, while Gardecki and 
Neumark found little evidence of a sustained negative effect. More recently, Hershbein 
(2012) finds that a recession reduces starting wages of high-school graduates by about 6 
percent, but that this penalty fades away within six years. Oreopoulos, von Wachter and 
Heisz (2012) exploit a large Canadian longitudinal dataset to show that the cost of a recession 
for new graduates is substantial and long lasting. A typical recession – a 5 percentage point 
rise in the unemployment rate – is associated with an initial loss of earnings of about 9 
percent that halves within 5 years, and finally fades to zero by 10 years. The economic 
mechanism operates via initial placements with lower paying employers and succeeding 
recoveries through gradual job mobility to better firms. Graduates in the lower quintile of the 
ability distribution suffer permanently lower wages, while the more able graduates quickly 
bounce back. Similar results are reported by Kahn (2010) who uses longitudinal data on US 
college graduates, though some of her results suggest that the wage penalty is longer lasting. 
By contrast, Benedetto, Gathright and Stinson (2010) find no evidence of a persistent impact 
of graduation-year unemployment on earnings using US social security earnings data.
5
  
Taking a somewhat different approach, Oyer (2006, 2008) has examined the career 
paths of particular occupations, namely economists and investment bankers, to assess the 
                                                 
5
 See also the international comparison of unemployment entry effects on labor market outcomes in the US and 
Japan by Genda et al. (2010). 
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importance of initial conditions. He shows that stock market conditions at the time of 
graduation have a strong effect on whether MBA students go directly to Wall Street, or 
instead pursue alternatives such as jobs in consulting firms. Further, he shows that starting a 
career in investment banking directly after graduation causes a person to be more likely to 
stay in the job and earn significantly more. These effects are substantial in size, amounting to 
several million dollars in terms of present value. 
Outside of the labor market literature, labor market entry conditions have been shown 
to impact other outcomes. MacLean (2013), for example, finds that males who graduate from 
high school during a recession show worse health outcomes at age forty than those graduating 
in a better labor market. This is true for both self-reported health measures and objective 
measures of physical and mental health. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) show that those 
who enter the labor market in recession are more likely to believe that success in life depends 
more on luck than effort and support more government redistribution. Again, these effects are 
seen to be long lasting. The protective effect of education for cohorts who graduate in 
recessions is studied by Cutler et al. (2014) in their analysis of Eurobarometer data. They 
report evidence of lower wages and life satisfaction together with higher obesity and a greater 
propensity to smoke and drink later in life for individuals who graduate in recession years, 
with higher education levels significantly moderating these negative outcomes. 
Our results uncover a more disturbing long-run effect of recessions. Based on a variety 
of individual and cohort level data for men aged up to 39 from the US and the UK, we report 
evidence of a systematic empirical link between crime and entry-level unemployment that 
very clearly shows young people who leave school in the midst of recessions are significantly 
more likely to lead a life of crime than those entering a buoyant labor market. Thus, as other 
economic and social outcomes are significantly affected by the state of the business cycle at 
the time when individuals potentially enter the labor market, so is criminal activity. We 
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conclude that recessions do play a role in the making of career criminals, as crime scars from 
higher entry level unemployment rates are both long lasting and substantial. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss possible 
links between initial conditions at labor market entry and the future path of criminal behavior 
as well as the underlying dynamics to motivate our empirical research. In Section 3, we 
discuss the empirical strategy. We present the cohort panel results and individual-level 
evidence in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
In the standard Becker (1968) economics of crime model, individuals act as rational decision 
makers and choose between legal and illegal activity. Their choice is based on the expected 
returns to both options. In this simple yet powerful framework, returns to legal activity are 
solely determined by the market earnings from employment whereas returns to illegal activity 
take into account the potential crime payoff, the probability of getting caught and the 
expected sanction if caught. If the expected return to illegal activity outweighs the expected 
return to legal activity, the individual chooses to commit crime. In the Becker model, higher 
unemployment reduces the returns to legal activity. Thus, individuals facing unemployment 
or higher risk of unemployment may become more likely to commit crime than they would 
have been otherwise. That effect is expected to be higher for young people who typically are 
less attached to the legal labor market than older individuals further on in their careers. 
The model has proved valuable in highlighting the economic incentives associated with 
criminal activity and its basic predictions on incentive and deterrence effects on crime have 
received substantial empirical support (see the reviews of Draca and Machin, 2015, Freeman, 
1999, and Chalfin and McCrary, 2014). Its weakness and limitation for our purposes is that it 
is explicitly static. Individuals make a one-off decision to commit crime or work in the legal 
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sector. There is no process through which decisions made in the current period have 
implications both for future decisions and for the choices available to the individual in later 
periods.  
 Mocan et al. (2005) develop a dynamic model that links recessions, human capital and 
crime.
6
 Individuals are lifetime utility maximizers with income coming from the legal and the 
criminal sector. Individuals have endowments of legal and criminal human capital, which 
depreciate over time. Both types of human capital rise with experience in the sector and are 
increased by investment in the respective sectors. The individual’s income is a function of 
human capital and rates of return in both sectors. In each period, the individual solves a 
dynamic stochastic optimization problem. First, they decide how much time to allocate to 
legal and criminal work and second, they decide on the optimal level of consumption. 
Crime is risky since a criminal faces a certain probability of being caught and sent to 
prison (or being punished otherwise). The probability of prison depends on the skill of the 
criminal as measured by criminal human capital and the amount of time spent in the criminal 
sector. While legal human capital may decline in prison in addition to depreciation effects, 
for example due to reputation effects, criminal human capital may increase if criminals in 
prison learn from each other. 
In this model, recessions impact on crime through the respective dynamic evolutions of 
legal and criminal human capital. In that sense, the long-term impact of recessions on crime 
differs with the length and the depth of a recession. In a recession, the returns to legal human 
capital fall. Following the arguments from the standard Becker (1968) model, involvement in 
criminal activity rises depending on the relative and absolute returns to crime. If involvement 
in criminal activity increases, the criminal human capital stock is expected to grow while the 
legal human capital stock depreciates. Once the recession ends, returns to legal human capital 
                                                 
6
 Other dynamic crime participation models include Flinn (1986) and Lochner (2004). 
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increase again, and the relative returns to criminal activity decrease. In a short recession, the 
stock of legal human capital typically remains significantly higher than the stock of criminal 
human capital, and the individual exits the criminal sector. Basically, in such a short 
recession, the individual is encouraged to get involved in criminal activity, but is not exposed 
to these conditions for a long enough period to develop sufficient criminal capital in order to 
yield higher returns in the crime market than in the legal market once the recession ends.  
If an individual is exposed to an unexpectedly long recession, the decision between 
legal and illegal activity changes in the same way as in a short recession. However, the 
individual’s criminal human capital stock grows over a longer time period whereas the legal 
human capital stock is expected to decline even more than in a shorter recession. These two 
effects may result in higher returns to criminal activity than to legal activity even after the 
recession ends. We expect more permanent effects of a recession on criminal behavior in that 
case. In addition, with higher involvement in criminal activity, the chances of being caught 
and imprisoned will rise. As explained above, if imprisoned, an individual’s criminal human 
capital stock may rise further in absolute terms, and certainly rises further relative to legal 
human capital. In that situation hysteresis can occur and trigger criminal careers. 
The mechanisms explained above are likely to be stronger for these individuals with 
initially low levels of legal human capital. New entrants to the labor market have developed 
less legal human capital and are less attached to the legal labor market. In our empirical 
analysis, we study cohorts entering the labor market in different economic conditions and 
estimate the effect of entering the labor market in a recession on subsequent crime outcomes. 
In the criminology literature there has been extensive focus on the concept of a criminal 
career and how it develops with age (see Piquero et al., 2003). A criminal career is often 
characterized by various stages: onset, persistence, escalation/specialization and desistance. 
Sampson and Laub (1993, 2005) characterize crime as a product of persistent individual 
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differences and local life events. They find that incarceration in later life is strongly related to 
the difficulty in securing stable work as individuals entered young adulthood.  
Our research question of whether labor market entry conditions matter for crime fits 
naturally into this framework. Unemployment at labor market entry (a local life event) can 
contribute to the onset of criminal behavior and/or can encourage the persistence of those 
youths that have already begun a criminal career. The long-run effect of unemployment at 
labor market entry then depends on the persistence and desistance effects. There has been less 
research on the duration of criminal careers. One study (Piquero et al., 2003) finds that, for 
offenders with two or more offences, the average duration of criminal careers was 10.4 years. 
In the discussion thus far we have implicitly assumed that unemployment at labor 
market entry causes the criminal career to begin at that point (or to intensify for those youths 
already active in crime). A complementary alternative would be that entry unemployment 
could have delayed effects on criminal behavior. Zara and Farrington (2010) study a group of 
late-onset offenders (those who commit their first crime aged 21 or over). They find a 
significant effect of high unemployment at age 16-18 as a predictor of subsequent offending 
(relative to a non-offending control group). To address this in our empirical analysis, we 
consider an approach that is flexible enough to permit differential timing of the effects of 
labor market entry unemployment effects on crime. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy  
Our empirical analysis exploits both panel data on year-of-birth cohorts over space and time 
and individual data for the US and the UK. The data are discussed in more detail in the 
following sections as well as in the Data Appendix.  
For the panel data, we observe age/birth cohorts as they enter the labor market and 
follow them through their (potential) working lives up to age 39. Our unit of analysis is 
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defined at the year-of-birth cohort (c), region (r), and calendar year (t) level where region 
refers to states in the US and to standard regions in the UK. We can estimate the long-run 
effect of initial labor market conditions by exploiting the regional variation in entry 
unemployment rates across cohorts using the following equation: 
log(C)crt = αc + αr + αt + αa + βUcr,0 + γXcrt + εcrt
 
(1) 
In (1), the dependent variable is the log crime rate for the cohort, region and time cell and we 
include fixed effects αc, αr, αt and αa for cohort, region, time and age. X is a set of control 
variables (defined below) and ε is an error term. Labor market entry occurs at date 0, so Ucr,0 
denotes the cohort-region specific unemployment rate at that date. 
The first pertinent feature of equation (1) is that (in common with a number of other 
applications when cohort data of different ages is followed over time) it is well known that 
one cannot separately identify age, cohort and time effects. We follow the standard approach 
of including a full-set of age, cohort and time fixed effects and arbitrarily dropping one 
additional cohort effect.
7
 Secondly, in order to adjust for cohort compositional differences, 
we include the X set of covariates at the level of our unit of analysis. In particular, we adjust 
for the average share of immigrants, male graduates, black males, married males and females 
per cohort in the region over the sample period.
8
 
The baseline model in (1) is restrictive in that it assumes that subsequent 
unemployment rates experienced by the cohort have no effect on their criminal behavior. In 
effect, the model allows us to estimate the average effect of entering the labor market in a 
recession on crime over the life-cycle, given the usual pattern of regional unemployment that 
cohorts experience after entry. For the focus of this paper, we are arguably more interested in 
the effect of entry unemployment net of subsequent labor market conditions. To isolate this 
                                                 
7
 We could alternatively have required the cohort-effects to sum to zero (Deaton, 1997), and our results prove to 
be robust to this alternative. 
8
 The specific control variables included are to account for demographic correlates of crime and for changing 
patterns of immigration (for examples of papers studying directly the connections between crime and 
immigration see Bell et al., 2013, Bianchi et al., 2012, and Mastrobuoni and Pinotti, 2015). 
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effect, we can include regional unemployment rates experienced by the cohort in the years 
after labor market entry. We measures these as Ucr,i, where i > 0 is the number of years since 
entry. This gives us a second, more general model to estimate: 
log(C)crt = αc + αr + αt + αa + βUcr,0 + ∑ δiUcr,i
I
i=1
  + γXcrt + εcrt (2) 
 
where i can theoretically take any value up to the latest year observed since labor market 
entry (for example, when t = 0 corresponds to age 16, it could run from 1 to 23 years 
subsequent to entry up to our maximum age of 39). A fully saturated unemployment rate 
model would allow the unemployment rate the cohort experienced in every year of their labor 
market experience to affect their crime rate. However, we restrict the coefficients on the i-
dated unemployment rates to affect the cohort crime rate only when the cohort reaches that 
point in the life-cycle. For example, the coefficient on regional unemployment five years 
after the cohort enters the labor market is restricted to be zero until the cohort actually 
reaches five years of experience. This ensures that future unemployment rates cannot affect 
current crime, which is intuitively sensible.  
Next, we introduce dynamics by further generalizing equations (1) and (2) to permit the 
main coefficient of interest on the initial unemployment rate, β, to vary with labor market 
experience/years since assumed labor market entry.
9
 This enables us to see to what extent the 
average effect of entry unemployment on a cohort occurs because of early scarring effects 
that erode as time since labor market entry increases or because of more persistent effects:  
log(C)crt = αc + αr + αt + αa + ∑ βe
E
e=1
[I(Exp=e)*Ucr,0] + γXcrt + εcrt
 
(3) 
 
                                                 
9
 Potential experience here is years since labor market entry (i.e. age - [age at year t = 0], with t = 0 being the 
assumed labor market entry age as defined below) so the notation of the age/experience fixed effect in the 
estimating equations can be interchangeably used as either αa or αe. 
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This specification allows β to vary with potential labor market experience (Exp, for 
experience groups e = 1,..,E) to measure the extent to which any effect of initial 
unemployment on criminal behavior persists with length of time since labor market entry. 
Our final and most general estimating equation further allows for the unemployment 
experienced after labor market entry to have permanent or transitory effects: 
log(C)crt = αc + αr + αt + αa + ∑ βe
E
e=1
[I(Exp=e)*Ucr,0] + 
∑ ∑ δie
E
e=1
[I(Exp=e)*Ucr,i] 
I
i=1
+ γXcrt + εcrt
 
 
(4) 
In (4) both the ’s and the ’s are allowed to depend on the length of time that passes since 
the entry and subsequent unemployment rate were experienced by the cohort. Again, the 
effects of subsequent unemployment are restricted to be zero until the cohort reaches the 
relevant age. 
It is important to be clear that identification comes from within-cohort variation in entry 
unemployment rates across states/regions. We view this as the most convincing approach that 
can be taken with the available data and this therefore forms the basis of most of our results. 
However it could be argued that removing the aggregate national unemployment rate at entry 
(which follows from including cohort fixed effects) removes much of the variation over time. 
To address this, we also report specifications using the national unemployment rate at labor 
market entry, including a quadratic cohort trend to account for changing cohort quality.  
For the micro-level data we observe cross-sections of individuals and can identify those 
who are incarcerated (in the US data) and those who report having ever been arrested (in the 
UK data). For each individual, we can match the unemployment rate at the time of labor 
market entry by area of residence and estimate probability models to explore the effect on 
criminal outcomes in later life. 
4. Cohort Panel Evidence 
12 
 
Details of US Panel Data  
For the US panel analysis, our measure of criminality is arrests. Use of arrests data is 
driven by two considerations. First, consistent annual incarceration data at the state and 
cohort level simply do not exist in the United States (see Pfaff, 2011). Second, it is of interest 
to measure criminality in a broad way to check that the results are robust. We therefore use 
arrest data from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). The UCR reports the number of 
arrests by year, state, age, gender and crime type. Our sample runs from 1980 to 2010.  
We obtain the number of arrests for property and violent crimes by respectively 
aggregating arrests over crime types. Our measure for property crime includes arrests for 
burglary, larceny, vehicle theft and arson, while our measure for violent crime includes 
arrests for murder, rape, robbery and assault. We produce arrest rates by dividing the number 
of arrests by the annual population in the observational unit, and scale by 1,000. Population 
data is retrieved from the US Census population estimates.  
The sample covers males aged between 16 and 39, the group of individuals with the 
highest crime propensity. The original data are grouped by age. Up to the age of 24 the data 
are reported by single age year, while for ages 25 and above the data are grouped in five-year 
age bands (25-29, 30-34, 35-39). As our empirical strategy exploits year-of-birth cohorts, we 
assume that year-of-birth cohorts within these older age groups of 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39 are 
homogeneous in terms of arrest rates. We then construct the number of arrests for single-
year-of-birth cohorts within these age groups by dividing the number of arrests by five. Our 
sample comprises year-of-birth cohorts that run from 1941 to 1994.
10
 Assuming that 
individuals enter the labor market at age 16, labor market entry would therefore occur from 
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 Our first year of data on arrests is 1980 and the oldest age we consider is 39, so this cohort was born in 1941. 
Similarly our data ends in 2010 and the youngest age is 16 (i.e. the 1994 birth-cohort). 
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1957 to 2010. We have data on state annual insured unemployment rates from 1957 until 
2010.
11
  
Since data for some states are systematically missing, we exclude these states from our 
analysis.
12
 States with missing data for a limited number of years only are included for the 
non-missing years, leading to an unbalanced panel.
13
 There is however no evidence to 
suggest that the states that do not report data differ significantly in terms of entry 
unemployment rates. We also exclude state-year observations that cover arrests for less than 
95 percent of the state population in that year.  
Two conceptual issues arise with these data. First, since we link the current arrest rate 
for a particular cohort in a given state to the entry unemployment rate of that cohort in the 
same state, we assume cohorts do not substantially move across states over time. So for 
example, we assume that the criminal behavior of the 30 year-old cohort in California in the 
year 2000 is affected by the unemployment rate in California in the year 1986, when that 
cohort entered the labor market. The empirical validity of this relies on no inter-state mobility 
since school-leaving age. If there is mobility but it is random since school exit, the estimates 
will merely be noisy. But, if mobility is driven by self-selection, the coefficient of interest 
may be biased. Following Dahl (2002), below we present robustness tests based on mobility 
corrections from the US Census.  
Second, in our empirical work for the US we use the average unemployment rate that 
the cohort experienced at ages 16 to 18 as our measure of entry unemployment. This is 
motivated by the observation that the majority of arrested criminals has low educational 
                                                 
11
 The downside of using that kind of data is that it does not allow us to distinguish between total and youth 
unemployment rates at labor market entry, nor provide measures of the duration of unemployment. 
12
 As described in the Data Appendix in more detail, excluded states are: Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, and Washington. As an 
example, New York is excluded since New York City (specifically the NYPD) systematically does not report 
arrests, and thus arrest data at state level would be heavily undercounted.  
13
 For example, Florida does report arrests until 1995, but not afterwards. Thus, we include Florida in our 
sample until 1995.  
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attainment and generally do leave school at or around the compulsory school leaving age. In 
the US Census data that we use in our microdata analysis, 86 percent of those incarcerated 
over the 1980-2010 sample had high school or less (<=12 years of education) as their highest 
level of education. Since school-leaving ages differ slightly across time and states, and 
unemployment within a cohort/state observation is autocorrelated, we use the 16 to 18 
average unemployment rate to characterize the state of the labor market that the cohort first 
experiences. An alternative would be to use the age 16 (or indeed age 17 or 18) 
unemployment rate only. We show below that our results are robust to these alternative 
approaches to defining entry unemployment. 
Details of UK Panel Data  
Crime data for the UK panel come from the Offenders Index Database (OID) and the 
Police National Computer (PNC). The measure of crime is convictions. This has the 
advantage of capturing actual offenders (subject of course to wrongful conviction) rather than 
the proportion of a particular cohort that come into contact with the police. The OID/PNC 
provides data on gender, date of birth, region of conviction and offence category. This data 
sample again runs from 1980 to 2010. Our variable construction matches that of the US 
panel. However, in contrast to the US, there is a standard national school-leaving age in the 
UK. For those leaving school by 1972, the compulsory school leaving-age was 15, and 16 
from 1973 onward. We use this compulsory age to date labor market entry for each cohort, 
rather than taking the 16 to 18 average. However, results are reported that again show that our 
conclusions are robust to this alternative measure of labor market entry. 
US Results 
We begin our analysis of the panel data by presenting evidence on the average effect of 
initial labor market conditions on criminal activity. In terms of the equations above, this 
corresponds to equation (1) that restricts the coefficient β to be the same across experience 
15 
 
groups. Panel A of Table 1 shows the results for the US. The dependent variable is the log of 
the crime rate. Columns (1), (3) and (5) consider the national unemployment rate at labor 
market entry while columns (2), (4) and (6) use the state unemployment rate at labor market 
entry (our preferred specification). All regressions include year, state and age fixed effects 
and cohort composition variables. The national results control for a quadratic cohort trend 
while the state results include a full set of cohort fixed effects. The regressions are weighted 
by cell-population and robust standard errors are clustered at the state-cohort level. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 show a strong positive estimated coefficient on the 
entry unemployment rate, whether we use the national or state-level variation in entry 
unemployment. For the state-level entry unemployment rate specification in column (2), the 
average arrest rate for a cohort entering the labor market in a recession is estimated to be 
around 10.2 percent higher than for a similar cohort entering into a normal labor market 
(using a 5 percentage point increase in unemployment as a measure of recession relative to 
normal).
14
 The estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
This amounts to a substantial estimate of labor market entry effects on crime, but in 
some respects the average effect of recessions may not be the most relevant parameter of 
interest. Within a cohort, there will be a substantial share for which the marginal effect is 
zero, since their optimal decision will be unaffected – i.e. they are at an interior solution that 
results in no illegal behavior and the recession does not move them across the threshold. Thus 
the average effect that we estimate is a combination of a zero effect for potentially a large 
share of the cohort and a substantial effect for those close to the legal/illegal threshold in the 
absence of a recession. Indeed, the results from the analysis of the individual-level Census 
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 We have used a five percentage points increase to measure a recession. This is in line with the scale of the 
unemployment rate increase in the Great Recession in the US, and also with the recessions seen in the UK over 
the whole period we analyse. However, this may be a little high for the US for pre-2000 recessions, where 
perhaps a 3 percentage point increase is a more appropriate magnitude of increase. Of course, the impact on the 
arrest rate would need to be scaled down by 3/5 for this recession size, so in the example here it would drop to 
6.1 percent. 
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data presented in Section 5 below will suggest that this is the case, as the estimated entry-
level unemployment effects are seen to be much larger for the less educated. The remaining 
columns show results for property crime and violent crime, using both national and state 
unemployment variation. The results suggest very similar and statistically significant effects 
in all cases. In all subsequent results, we report only those that use state-level unemployment 
rates as we view this as providing the most convincing identification.
15
  
As previously discussed, one may have potential concerns about inter-state mobility in 
the US data. More precisely, the presence of mobility raises the question of what is the 
correct (best measured) entry unemployment rate for cohort c at time t in state s? So far we 
have used the unemployment rate in state s at the time that cohort c left high-school. This 
ignores any mobility and if potential criminals move across state boundaries, this could be of 
concern. Some of those in cohort c at time t in state s will have completed high-school in 
state k and entered the labor market there. For this part of the cohort, the correct entry 
unemployment rate is of course the unemployment rate in state k at the time cohort c left 
high-school. Dahl (2002) makes the same point regarding estimates of state-specific earnings 
returns to education, which he shows differ substantially across states. His solution is to use 
reported migration flows across states to correct the estimated returns. We can follow broadly 
the same procedure here for the US, though such data is not available for the UK. We use the 
5 percent US Census for 1980, 1990 and 2000 and the 2010 ACS to calculate for each cohort 
c in state s the distribution of states-of-birth. Assuming that state-of-birth and state-at-16 are 
highly correlated, we generate a mobility-adjusted entry unemployment rate for cohort c in 
state s as: 
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 We have also broken down property and violent crime into more disaggregated measures of crime types 
(breaking violent crime separately into murder, rape, assault and robbery and property crime separately into 
burglary, larceny theft, vehicle theft and arson) and find there to be significant positive estimates of entry level 
unemployment rates for all crimes with the exception of murder. These results are in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
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Ucs = ∑ pcskUck
K
k=1  
(5) 
where p is the proportion of cohort c in state s that were born in state k. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports estimates using this mobility-adjusted entry unemployment 
rate. The results are robust to the new specification, in that a positive and substantial entry-
level unemployment rate effect on crime remains. The effect tends to be slightly larger in 
magnitude (at 2.470 compared to 2.039 in Column (2)), but very much validates the earlier 
results. Hence, this robustness check offers a useful corroboration of our main results as, if 
anything, we appear to marginally underestimate the effect of initial unemployment at labor 
market entry on crime when we do not adjust for inter-regional mobility (although all the 
differences between mobility adjusted and non-adjusted estimates are not distinguishable 
from one another in terms of statistical significance). 
For the 1980-2000 time period, we also explored what happened to the entry-level 
unemployment rate on inclusion of the state-level “crack index” constructed by Fryer et al. 
(2013). The main results fully survived its inclusion and the crack index itself displayed a 
positive and significant relation with the arrest rate.
16
 Thus the results remain robust to 
controlling for the crack prevalence index that has been shown to be a driver of US crime 
rates in the period that we study. 
UK Results 
The UK results are shown in Table 2. The only specification difference compared to the 
US results is that we allow cohort composition effects to have different coefficients in 
London compared to the rest of the UK. The differences in these estimated coefficients are 
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 In fact, when the impact of the crack index was broken down into the sub-periods that Fryer et al. (2013) use 
– 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94 and 1995-2000 – we obtain similar estimates with the most important positive 
crime association being in 1985-89.   But the estimated coefficient on the entry-level unemployment rate was 
barely affected. For the 1980-2000 time period the estimated coefficient (standard error) on specifications 
comparable to column (2) of Table 1 were 1.156 (0.393) for the entry-level unemployment rate and 1.480 
(0.557) for the mobility adjusted rate. On inclusion of the time varying crack index these respectively became 
1.155 (0.383) and 1.549 (0.548). 
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statistically significant, suggesting that over time cohort composition and their effects on 
crime have differed substantially between London and the rest of the UK.
17
 
 We again find a statistically significant effect of entry unemployment on overall crime. 
Taking the estimated coefficient in Column (2), a recession that raises the (regional) 
unemployment rate by 5 percentage points would raise the lifetime conviction rate by 4 
percent. We are somewhat skeptical about magnitudes when using national entry 
unemployment as the source of identification. The difficulty arises because we have to 
assume a specific functional form for the cohort effect whereas when regional entry 
unemployment is used we can non-parametrically control for the cohort effect since 
identification comes from within-cohort variation across regions. To see the sensitivity of the 
results to this, note that the coefficient on national entry unemployment in column (1) of 
Table 2 is 2.664 (0.189) when we allow a quadratic cohort trend. If instead we allow a quartic 
cohort trend this coefficient drops to 1.007 (0.189). We prefer to focus on the results that 
exploit within-cohort variation. 
Panel B of Table 2 focuses on whether all recessions are alike. A feature of the labor 
market common to European countries over the last forty years, but almost completely absent 
for the US (until the Great Recession), has been the incidence of long-term unemployment. 
We might expect, and the model of Mocan et al. (2005) predicts, that recessions characterized 
by rising rates of long-term unemployment would be much worse for potential scarring. Of 
course, initially a rising duration for the stock of currently unemployed is positive for new 
entrants since the stock of unemployed provides less competition for available vacancies, but 
we might expect this effect to be fleeting before the negative effects of unemployment 
duration on new entrants takes its toll. To examine this we divide the entry unemployment 
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 An alternative would be to estimate the models using the regional dimension outside of London only. Results 
available on request show that this generates the same qualitative results as reported in the main text, though the 
precision tends to be somewhat higher. We prefer to include London and control directly for differences in the 
effect of cohort composition. Note that we do not allow for separate cohort effects for London, since this would 
remove any variation in entry unemployment for London. 
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rate in the UK into the short-term and long-term unemployment rate. Short-term 
unemployment covers all those with a current unemployment spell of less than twelve 
months. For our entire sample, the average unemployment rate of 7.4 percent is made up of a 
short-term rate of 4.6 percent and a long-term rate of 2.8 percent. The results reported in 
Panel B show strongly that it is deep and long recessions characterized by high long-term 
unemployment that are particularly problematic. 
Dynamic Effects 
The specification used in Tables 1 and 2 implies that subsequent unemployment rates 
do not matter, or are at least orthogonal to the entry unemployment rate. There is no reason 
for this to be the case and so we follow the earnings study of Oreopoulos et al. (2012) in 
allowing for subsequent unemployment rates to affect our outcome of interest, crime, in 
addition to the entry rate. We do so by including the average unemployment rates for ages 
19-21, 22-24 and 25-27. In essence this means that for a particular cohort we allow for their 
crime path to be explained by both the unemployment experienced when entering the labor 
market and the unemployment rates they experience over the next 10 years.
18
 
Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix present the results of this exercise. It is perhaps 
most useful to focus on column (3) where we allow for two changes, breaking the age 16-18 
unemployment rate into its component parts and allowing for subsequent unemployment 
rates. On the first of these, when we allow for separate estimated effects for any individual 
year of unemployment, the estimates are imprecise. However, the p-value from a hypothesis 
test of the joint significance of the three individual year effects is significant at the 1 percent 
level. The reason is that there is a high degree of autocorrelation in the within-cohort 
unemployment rate.
19
 We therefore prefer to either use the age 16 effect alone (recognizing 
                                                 
18
 We have also experimented with including unemployment rates prior to school-leaving age. Their additional 
inclusion leaves the positive and significant estimated impact of entry unemployment intact. 
19
 Appendix Figures A2 and A3 show this strong persistence in the autocovariances of unemployment rates 
within a cohort/state group for the US and UK, respectively.  
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that it is picking up effects for age 17 and 18 as well) or use the three-year average. As 
columns (1) and (2) show, it matters little which we choose. The second key result of column 
(3) is that none of the subsequent three-year average unemployment rates that the cohort 
experiences has an individually significant effect on arrests. This helps us to better 
understand a puzzle in the literature that we referred to in the introduction: the overall link 
between crime and unemployment appears quite weak in many studies. Our results show that 
the key effect from unemployment on a cohort’s crime trajectory is the early experience of 
unemployment rather than the average unemployment experienced over the life-cycle. 
Tables 1 and 2 demonstrated a statistically significant and economically substantial 
effect of initial unemployment conditions on the arrest rates of cohorts over their entire 
lifetime. But we are also interested in the persistence of this. Is the entry unemployment 
effect primarily driven by a very large impact on crime in the early years after labor market 
entry that subsides as the young age and go on to establish a stable legal career? Or is the 
effect persistent, with some of those affected by harsh labor market conditions at labor 
market entry pushed into a criminal career that becomes self-perpetuating for the reasons 
discussed in Section 2? To study this, we allow the coefficient on initial unemployment to 
vary by years since labor market entry as outlined in equation (3) of section 3.  
We group experience into four categories (0-5, 6-11, 12-17 and 18-21 years) and use an 
identical regression specification as in Table 1. Experience is set to 0 for ages 16 to 18. The 
results are shown in Tables 3 and 4 for the US and UK respectively, with columns (1) and (2) 
showing results for all crimes, and columns (3) and (4) for property and violent crime, 
respectively. Column (1) is estimated without controlling for subsequent unemployment 
whereas columns (2) to (4) allow for these effects interacted with experience dummies (i.e. 
equation (4)). There are strong positive effects of entry unemployment on arrests in the early 
years in the labor market, that fall as experience increases. However, even a decade after 
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leaving school there remain significant positive effects from entry unemployment on crime 
rates. Juveniles who leave school in a recession have higher crime rates during their first few 
years in the labor market and higher crime rates over a decade later than juveniles who leave 
school in a buoyant economy. 
An alternative specification to examine the persistence of entry unemployment allows 
the interaction term with experience to vary with individual years of experience (rather than 
group experience as in Tables 3 and 4). Figures 1 and 2 plot the estimated coefficients 
(together with the 95 percent confidence intervals) for every year of labor market experience 
for the US and UK, respectively.
20
 Again, the drop in the effect after the first few years of 
labor market entry is clear, but the individual year estimates suggest a consistent longer 
lasting scarring effect for both countries.  
 
5. Individual-Level Evidence 
Details of US Micro Data  
The micro-level data on US incarceration of individuals comes from US decennial 
Census and American Community Survey (ACS) data. We study all males aged 18-39 from 
the 5 percent samples of the 1980, 1990 and 2000 Census and the 2008-2012 ACS from 
IPUMS-USA (the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series). We identify the institutionalized 
population using the Group Quarters variable contained in these data sources. However, only 
in the 1980 sample is the Group Quarters variable available at a detailed enough level to 
uniquely identify those in correctional facilities. In subsequent Censuses (and in the ACS), 
the institutionalized population includes the following additional categories: correctional 
facilities, nursing homes and mental hospitals, and juvenile institutions. Fortunately for our 
purposes, among the younger ages we focus upon, the share of the total institutionalized 
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 Figures A4 and A5 in the Appendix show the respective results when one allows unemployment rates later in 
life to enter the regression. The figures show patterns that are substantively the same. 
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population accounted for by those in correctional facilities is very high in our sample (see 
Appendix Table A4 and its surrounding discussion in the Data Appendix on the validity of 
this). The additional covariates from the Census data include race, marital status, veteran 
status and education. 
Details of UK Micro Data  
Our micro-level data for the UK comes from the British Crime Survey (BCS). The BCS 
is a large (45,000 individuals) annual cross-section survey used to construct measures of 
crime victimization. Each year, a sub-sample of respondents is asked whether they have ever 
been arrested by the police. There is no information on the type of crime for which they were 
arrested, or on the eventual outcome. However, as we used conviction data in the UK panel 
analysis, it is useful to have an alternative counterpoint measure of criminal behavior (as in 
Lochner and Moretti, 2004) to evaluate robustness. We have a broad array of personal 
characteristics including education, ethnicity, marital status, housing status and employment 
and income.  
US Results 
Panel A of Table 5 reports marginal effects from a probit regression on the Census 
incarceration data. We use state-at-birth to identify the state in which the individual went to 
school (Dahl, 2002) and so restrict the data to those born in the United States. Column (1) 
reports the results for the full sample of males aged 18-39 whilst the subsequent three 
columns focus on samples defined by educational attainment. All regressions include a full 
set of year, state of residence, state of birth and cohort effects, a quartic in age and controls 
for race, education, marital status and veteran status. 
The estimated coefficient on entry unemployment in column (1) is 0.038. The mean of 
the dependent variable is 0.030 (i.e. 3 percent of males aged 18-39 are incarcerated). Thus, 
entering the labor market in a time of recession (defined as the unemployment rate being 5 
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percentage points higher than normal) results in a 6.3 percent increase in the probability of 
being incarcerated at the time of subsequent Census survey dates. However, we can see from 
the subsequent columns that this effect is almost entirely due to the high-school dropouts. A 
recession increases this group’s probability of incarceration by 6.6 percent, from an already 
high mean of 8.9 percent. These are sizeable effects taking into account that this is averaged 
over more than twenty years of the individual’s post-school experience. 
Finally, columns (3) and (4) show only weak effects for those who successfully 
graduate from high school and no effect at all for those with 4-years of college – who should 
of course not be affected by the unemployment rate at the compulsory school-leaving age.
 21
 
The results in Panel B show that redefining the 1980 measure of incarceration by explicitly 
excluding those not in correctional facilities (see the Data Appendix for discussion) does not 
alter the conclusions. This suggests that policy focused explicitly on the least educated during 
periods of high unemployment would likely reduce crime substantially more within that 
group than the average estimate from the previously reported panel regressions would imply. 
UK Results 
For the UK, we look at individual-level data on self-reported arrests. The data provide 
information on the age at which the respondent left full-time education and so allow us to 
precisely date the year of labor market entry. The data also provide an extensive set of 
personal characteristics, which we would expect to be correlated with criminal activity. There 
are two key disadvantages in using these micro data. First, there is the usual concern 
associated with the self-reporting of arrests. In the context of this study, however, this would 
only bias our estimates if the self-reporting probability varied within a cohort depending on 
the initial entry unemployment rate. It seems hard to us to make such a case. Second, we have 
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 To further examine the sensitivity of our results to mobility, we restricted the Census sample in Table 5 to 
include only those observations where the state of residence was the same as the state of birth. Re-estimating 
Table 5 with this restricted sample produces estimated coefficients (and associated standard errors) of 0.047 
(0.024) and 0.161 (0.074) for the first two columns. The coefficients in the final two columns remain small in 
magnitude and statistically insignificant. 
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no information of when the arrest occurred – the question is simply whether the individual 
has ever been arrested. That means that this data allows us to estimate the average impact of 
initial entry unemployment on the probability of being arrested in adulthood, but does not 
allow us to investigate the time pattern of the persistence of such effects. 
We estimate probit models with the dependent variable taking the value one if the 
respondent reports having ever been arrested by the police. We include survey year dummies 
and an extensive set of personal controls. Table 6 reports the results. Column (1) shows an 
estimated significant positive coefficient on the entry unemployment rate – a recession (again 
defined as a 5 percentage points higher than normal unemployment rate) is associated with a 
5.7 percent increase in the probability of ever being arrested.  
In the second column we restrict attention to those whose highest educational 
qualification was achieved at age 16 and therefore definitely left education at age 16. Here, 
we can more closely link the exit from education and the initial unemployment rate, which 
results in a sample that is likely to contain a larger fraction of individuals at risk of criminal 
behavior. As expected, we find a substantially larger and more significant impact of entry 
unemployment for this group – a recession raises the probability of ever being arrested by 8 
percent.  
In the final column we conduct a placebo-type experiment. We examine the arrest 
record of individuals who report educational qualifications that require school attendance at 
least to age 18. This group should not have been directly affected by the unemployment rate 
when they were 16. Sure enough, we no longer find a positive effect for these individuals – 
indeed the estimated coefficient on the entry unemployment rate is indistinguishable from 
zero, though the standard error is large. 
Overall, then, the individual-level analysis of the relationship between crime and entry-
level unemployment produces results that are very similar to the cohort panel analysis of 
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Section 4. This is true for both countries, despite some differences in the nature of the data 
that is available. The individual data permits us to study variations across individuals with 
different levels of education in more detail than the more macro cohort analysis which does 
not permit such differentiation. It is highly reassuring that the overall pattern of results are 
very consistent across the two. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We have presented the first evidence that recessions can lead to substantial and persistently 
higher rates of criminal behavior among those likely to be most impacted by such conditions 
– those newly entering the labor market. In contrast to much of the evidence on the long-run 
effect of initial unemployment on wages and career trajectories, we find that the effect on 
criminal behavior remains substantial, though attenuated, a number of years after labor 
market entry. These sizable and persistent entry level unemployment effects show that 
recessions can produce career criminals. One might argue that our results are also consistent 
with a one-time criminal event for individuals in a particular cohort that happens at different 
times since leaving school and that the probability of such a subsequent event could be higher 
if entry level unemployment were higher. Such a view would however be in conflict with two 
key empirical findings in the criminology literature, both of which are consistent with our 
interpretation of the results: late-onset offending is extremely rare and prolific offenders 
account for a disproportionate share of total crime.  
This evidence of a crime scarring effect from unemployment at the time of labor market 
entry emerges from empirical analysis of a range of different US and UK data sources, both 
at the level of the individual and from longitudinal analysis of age/birth cohorts over time. 
Whilst the reported effects are likely to be one factor amongst several that can plausibly 
explain the very sizable swings in youth criminality that have occurred in both countries in 
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the past few decades, the evidence of crime scars does demonstrate a rather more disturbing 
long-run effect of recessions. In doing so, it also adds to the research picture that the state of 
the business cycle when people leave school and enter the labor market can have profound 
and sizable impacts on economic and social outcomes across their life.  
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Figure 1: Entry Unemployment Effects By Experience, US 
 
 
 
 
                  Notes: Derived from specification comparable to that in column (1) of Table 3, with separate 
                  estimates for each year of experience. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Entry Unemployment Effects By Experience, UK 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Derived from specification comparable to that in column (1) of Table 4,  
with separate estimates for each year of experience. 
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Table 1: US Cohort Panel Estimates, Basic Specifications 
 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Crime Type: All All Property Property Violent Violent 
       
 
Panel A 
      
       
National Entry U Rate at Age 16-18 1.550***  1.419*  1.871***  
 (0.506)  (0.732)  (0.519)  
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18  2.039***  2.115***  2.156*** 
  (0.443)  (0.598)  (0.524) 
 
Panel B 
 
      
Mobility Adjusted State Entry U Rate at 
Age 16-18 
 
2.470*** 
 
2.016** 
 
3.288*** 
  (0.609) 
 
 (0.771) 
 
 (0.776) 
 
       
State Fixed Effects x x x x x x 
Year Fixed Effects x x x x x x 
Quadratic Cohort Trend                                          x  x  x  
Cohort Fixed Effects  x  x  x 
Age Fixed Effects x x x x x x 
Compositional Adjustment x x x x x x 
       
Sample Size 19,429 19,429 19,429 19,429 19,429 19,429 
       
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the log male arrest rate from the UCR. Sample runs from 1980-2010. Individual year-of-birth cohorts run from 1941-1994. We assume that 
cohorts enter the labor market between the age of 16 and 18. All insured unemployment rates are measured as the average unemployment rate at the three potential years of 
labor market entry. All regressions include year, age and state fixed effects. We include control variables for cohort compositional adjustments (average share of 
immigrants, male graduates, black men, married men and females per cohort in that state 1980-2010). Columns (1), (3) and (5) include the cohort-level national 
unemployment rate at labor market entry and include a cohort quadratic trend. Columns (2), (4) and (6) include cohort-level state unemployment rates and include cohort 
fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-cohort level and regressions are weighted by the male cell-population. 
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 2: UK Cohort Panel Estimates, Basic Specifications 
 
       
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Crime Type: All All Property Property Violent Violent 
       
 
Panel A  
 
      
National Entry U Rate at Age 16 2.664*** 
(0.189) 
  3.443*** 
(0.249) 
 0.803*** 
(0.191) 
 
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16  0.811*** 
(0.277) 
 0.712** 
(0.350) 
 1.531*** 
(0.365)         
Panel B 
 
      
Region Entry Short-Term U Rate at Age 16  -1.188* 
(0.620) 
 -1.008 
(0.767) 
 -1.074 
(0.933)         
Region Entry Long-Term U Rate at Age 16  1.687*** 
(0.372) 
 1.466*** 
(0.474) 
 2.673*** 
(0.464)      
    
       
Region Fixed Effects x x x x x x 
Year Fixed Effects x x x x x x 
Quadratic Cohort Effect x  x  x  
Cohort Fixed Effects  x  x  x 
Age Fixed Effects x x x x x x 
Compositional Adjustment x x x x x x 
       
Sample Size 7,440 7,440 7,440 7,440 7,440 7,440 
       
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the log male conviction rate from the OID/PNC. Sample runs from 1980-2010. Individual year-of-birth cohorts run from 1941-
1994. We assume that cohorts enter the labor market at age 15/16. All unemployment rates are measured in year of labor market entry. We include control 
variables for cohort compositional adjustments (average share of immigrants, male graduates, nonwhite men and married men in each cohort/region, 1980-2010), 
allowing for differential effects of composition in London. All regressions include year, age, and region fixed effects. Columns (1), (3) and (5) include the 
cohort-level national unemployment rate at labor market entry and include a cohort quadratic trend. Columns (2), (4) and (6) include cohort-level region 
unemployment rates and include cohort fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the region-cohort level and regressions are weighted by the 
male cell-population. 
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* indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 3: US Cohort Panel Estimates, Effects by Labor Market Experience Groups 
 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Crime Type: All All Property Violent 
     
     
     
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18*Exp(0-5) 3.609*** 3.290*** 1.481** 5.151*** 
 (0.626) (0.702) (0.717) (1.124) 
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18*Exp(6-11) 1.926*** 1.705*** 0.965 2.615*** 
 (0.535) (0.617) (0.737) (0.821) 
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18*Exp(12-17) 1.475*** 1.558** 2.151** 0.883 
 (0.556) (0.643) (0.911) (0.752) 
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18*Exp(18-21) 1.515*** 2.421*** 3.345*** 2.032** 
 (0.566) (0.707) (0.959) (0.859) 
     
     
State Fixed Effects x x x x 
Year Fixed Effects x x x x 
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x x 
Age Fixed Effects x x x x 
Compositional adjustment x x x x 
     
Allowing for subsequent U rates - x x x 
     
Sample Size 19,429 19,429 19,429 19,429 
     
 
Notes: As for columns (2), (4) and (6) specifications of Panel A, Table 1. 
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 4: UK Cohort Panel Estimates, Effects by Labor Market Experience Groups 
 
     
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) 
 All All Property Violent 
     
     
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16*Exp(0-5)      0.861***      0.967***       0.972***  1.034* 
 (0.305) (0.316) (0.362) (0.532) 
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16*Exp(6-11)       0.913***       0.970***      1.050***     0.996** 
 (0.284) (0.298) (0.365) (0.444) 
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16*Exp(12-17)     0.832**     0.809** 0.733      1.369*** 
 (0.343) (0.358) (0.448) (0.435) 
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16*Exp(18-23) 0.582 0.529 0.124       2.701*** 
 (0.369) (0.405) (0.502) (0.504) 
     
     
Region Fixed Effects x x x x 
Year Fixed Effects x x x x 
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x x 
Age Fixed Effects x x x x 
Compositional Adjustment x x x x 
     
Subsequent U-Exp Interactions  x x x 
     
Sample Size 7,440 7,440 7,440 7,440 
     
 
Notes: As for columns (2), (4) and (6) specifications of Panel A, Table 2. 
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 5: US Individual Level Estimates, Census/ACS Incarceration Regressions, 1980-2010 
 
 
 
 
Sample: 
 
(1) 
 
All Males 
 
 
(2) 
 
HS Dropouts 
 
(3) 
 
HS Grads 
 
(4) 
 
4yr College 
 
A. Aged 18 And Over 
    
 
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18 
 
    0.038** 
(0.018) 
 
  0.117* 
(0.063) 
 
0.023 
(0.030) 
 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
     
     
B. Aged 18 And Over, 1980 Redefined     
     
 
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18 
  
  0.035* 
(0.018) 
     
    0.130** 
(0.062) 
 
0.016 
(0.030) 
 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
     
Year Effects x x x x 
State Effects x x x x 
State/Race Effects x x x x 
Cohort Effects x x x x 
State of Birth Effects x x x x 
Age Quartic x 
 
x x x 
Sample Size 5,759,537 798,546 2,552,973 1,164,030 
     
 
Notes: Table reports estimated marginal effects from a probit where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is institutionalized and 0 
otherwise. Sample covers males aged 18-39 who are not in school, and born in the United States. Entry unemployment is the unemployment rate at age 16 in the 
state of birth. Data are from the 1980, 1990 and 2000 5 percent IPUMS US Census and the 2008-2012 IPUMS ACS. Regressions also include marital status, 
race, education and veteran status indicators. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state/cohort level and regressions are weighted with the Census 
person weight. 
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 6: UK Self Report Arrest Regressions, 2001/2 to 2010/11 
 
    
 
(1) 
 
(2) (3) 
 Ever Arrested Ever Arrested, 
Age 16 
Qualification 
Ever Arrested, 
Age 18+ 
Qualification 
    
    
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16     0.259**       0.543*** 0.055 
 (0.125) (0.166) (0.207) 
    
Year Dummies x x x 
Personal Controls x x x 
    
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.216 0.288 0.153 
    
Sample Size 22,281 7,849 9,006 
    
 
Notes: Table reports estimated marginal effects from a probit where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual reports having ever been 
arrested and 0 otherwise. Personal controls include age (10 categories), ethnic group (5 categories), education (9 categories where appropriate), student status, 
marital status (4 categories), income (18 categories), economic status (15 categories), number of children (10 categories), housing tenure (8 categories), years at 
address (9 categories), years in area (9 categories), and government office region (10 categories). The sample covers ages 16 to 65 of pooled British Crime 
Surveys, 2001-2002 to 2010-2011. Regressions use individual sample weights. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the government office region level. 
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Appendix 1: Additional Figures and Tables 
 
 
 
Figure A1a: Male Offender Rates by Age, US 
 
 
 
               Notes: Male arrest rates by age, calculated from UCR data (see Data Appendix for more detail). 
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Figure A1b: Male Offender Rates by Age, UK 
 
 
 
Notes: Male conviction rates by age, calculated from OID/PNC data (see Data Appendix for more detail). 
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Figure A2: Autocovariance Structure of Unemployment Rates, US 
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Figure A3: Autocovariance Structure of Unemployment Rates, UK 
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Figure A4: Entry Unemployment Effects By Experience Controlling  
for Subsequent Unemployment-Experience Interactions, US 
 
  
 
Notes: Derived from specification comparable to that in column (2) of Table 3, with separate  
estimates for each year of experience. 
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Figure A5: Entry Unemployment Effects By Experience Controlling  
for Subsequent Unemployment-Experience Interactions, UK 
 
 
 
Notes: Derived from specification comparable to that in column (2) of Table 4, with separate  
estimates for each year of experience. 
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Table A1: US Baseline Results by Detailed Crime Type 
 
        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Offence: Burglary Theft Arson Murder Rape Robbery Assault 
        
        
A: Basic Specification 
        
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18      2.977***      3.589***      4.692***     -3.094***      3.393***      2.225***     2.106*** 
 (0.652) (0.759) (0.735) (1.164) (0.627) (0.759) (0.638) 
        
B: By Labour Market Experience Groups 
        
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18*Exp(0-5) -0.639      3.809***      6.512*** -3.157*      4.093*** 1.516     4.385*** 
 (0.838) (0.889) (1.085) (1.704) (1.042) (1.079) (1.329) 
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18*Exp(6-11) 0.101      2.644***      5.177***       -0.647      5.208*** 1.587    2.366** 
 (0.781) (0.952) (1.098) (1.746) (0.922) (1.067) (0.942) 
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18*Exp(12-17)     3.667***      3.858*** 1.836*     -3.661*** 0.845 1.305 0.945 
 (0.882) (1.110) (0.989) (1.410) (0.919) (1.135) (0.804) 
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18*Exp(18-21)      5.392***      5.202***      5.561*** -0.851 0.063      3.541***     2.212** 
 (0.961) (1.109) (1.078) (1.489) (1.076) (1.186) (0.899) 
        
        
State Fixed Effects x x x x x x x 
Year Fixed Effects x x x x x x x 
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x x x x x 
Age Fixed Effects x x x x x x x 
Compositional Adjustment x x x x x x x 
        
Sample Size Panel B 19,429 19,429 19,429 19,429 19,429 19,429 19,429 
        
Notes: For Panel A as for columns (2), (4) and (6) specifications in Table 1; for Panel B as for columns (2)-(4) specifications in Table 3 (allowing for subsequent 
U rates). 
*  indicates significance at the 10 percent level.** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table A2: US Cohort Panel Estimates, Allowing for Subsequent Unemployment Rates 
 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Crime Type: All All All All 
     
     
     
State Entry U Rate at Age 16 1.525***  0.797  
 (0.381)  (0.570)  
State Entry U Rate at Age 17   0.236  
   (0.744)  
State Entry U Rate at Age 18      1.481**  
   (0.678)  
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18  2.039***  2.385*** 
  (0.443)  (0.496) 
State Entry U Rate at Age 19-21   -0.517 -0.384 
   (0.536) (0.541) 
State Entry U Rate at Age 22-24 
 
 -0.882 
(0.538) 
-0.904* 
(0.538) 
State Entry U Rate at Age 25-27   -0.783 -0.790 
   (0.525) (0.524) 
 
p(sum of 16, 17, 18 effects = 0) 
 
   
     0.000*** 
 
     
State Fixed Effects x x x x 
Year Fixed Effects x x x x 
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x x 
Age Fixed Effects x x x x 
Compositional adjustment x x x x 
     
Sample Size 19,487 19,429 19,429 19,429 
     
 
Notes: As for column (2) specification of Table 1.  
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table A3: UK Cohort Panel Estimates, Allowing for Subsequent Unemployment Rates 
 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Crime Type: All All All All 
     
     
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16 0.811***      0.862*  0.815***    
 (0.277)  (0.477) (0.281) 
Region Entry U Rate at Age 17   0.143  
   (0.555)  
Region Entry U Rate at Age 18         -0.227  
   (0.471)  
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16-18   0.770***        
  (0.286)   
Region Entry U Rate at Age 19-21   0.048 0.024 
   (0.218) (0.217) 
Region Entry U Rate at Age 22-24 
 
  -0.102 
(0.212) 
-0.105 
(0.212) 
Region Entry U Rate at Age 25-27   0.129 0.129 
   (0.237) (0.237) 
 
p(sum of 16, 17, 18 effects = 0) 
 
   
     0.009*** 
 
     
Region Fixed Effects x x x x 
Year Fixed Effects x x x x 
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x x 
Age Fixed Effects x x x x 
Compositional adjustment x x x x 
     
Sample Size 7,440 7,410 7,410 7,410 
     
 
Notes: As for column (2) specification of Table 2.  
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table A4: US Male Population in Group Quarters by Type and Age, 1980-2010 
 
 
 
 
Total Institutionalized 
 
Correctional Institutions 
 
Correctional as  Percent of 
Total 
 
 
1980 Census 
 
   
All 1232120 439720 35.7 
15-17 68300 8460 12.4 
18-21 123320 89600 72.7 
22-24 104060 80240 77.1 
25-39 301980 205780 68.1 
    
1990 Census 
 
   
All 1801350 1030210 57.2 
15-17 68480 16490 24.1 
18-21 149780 128940 86.1 
22-24 143890 133490 92.8 
25-39 666690 581670 87.2 
    
2000 Census 
 
   
All 2534060 1806260 71.3 
15-17 87200 18960 21.7 
18-21 221660 202470 91.3 
22-24 201060 195660 97.3 
25-39 951660 911050 95.7 
    
2010 Census 
 
   
All 2716877 2059020 75.8 
15-19 153924 74720 48.5 
20-24 327760 308926 94.3 
25-39 971581 945065 97.3 
    
 
Notes: Data from 1980 are calculated from IPUMS data, figures for 1990, 2000 and 2010 come from the US Census 
Bureau. 
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Appendix 2: Data Description 
 
A. United States 
 
A1. Panel Data on Arrests 
 
Panel data for the US come from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). The measure of crime 
is arrests. The UCR reports the number of arrests by year, state, age, gender and type of crime. 
The original data identifies the number of arrests by law enforcement agencies within states. We 
construct a state-level panel on arrests by aggregating the number of arrests over law enforcement 
agencies within a state. Within the UCR, data for certain states are systematically missing either 
for the whole state or for important law enforcement agencies within that state. For example, 
New York City systematically does not report arrest numbers which implies that New York state 
level counts on arrests would be heavily undercounted if we simply aggregated the number of 
arrests over all reporting agencies. Hence, we exclude the following states from our sample: 
Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, 
Ohio, South Dakota and Washington. 
 
Data for some states are missing for a limited number of years only. For example, Florida reports 
arrests until 1995, but not afterwards. Since there is no evidence that would suggest that these 
states differ significantly in terms of unemployment rates, we exclude the respective years only 
and keep the non-missing years of these states as observations in the sample, leading to an 
unbalanced sample. In the example above that means that we include Florida in our sample until 
1995. In addition, the UCR reports the total population for each law enforcement agency in the 
reported year. Aggregating the UCR population count to the state-year level and comparing that 
number to official population counts allows us to identify state-year observations that cover 
arrests for less than 95 percent of the state population. Since these arrest counts are likely to 
underreport the true number of arrests in that state and year, we exclude the respective 
observations from our sample. Whenever single state-year observations are missing in the 
resulting sample, we impute values using a linear interpolation method. Our results are robust to 
excluding imputed observations. 
 
We sample males aged 16 to 39 from 1980 to 2010. The UCR data are grouped by age category. 
From age 16 up to the age of 24, the number of arrests is measured by single age year. For ages 
25 and above, the arrests are aggregated to the number of arrests in a five-year age bracket, i.e. 25 
to 29, 30 to 34, and 35 to 39. In order to be able to track the number of arrests per year-of-birth 
cohort, we therefore disaggregate the arrest measure to the number of arrests by single age year 
by dividing the arrest count by five. The underlying assumption is that year-of-birth cohorts are 
homogenous in terms of the number of arrests within the respective age bracket. Following the 
literature, we categorize arrests into property and violent crime using the UCR offense code 
variable as follows: 
 
Violent crime: 
 
Property crime:  
01A = Murder and non-negligent manslaughter 05 = Burglary – breaking or entering 
01B = Manslaughter by negligence 06 = Larceny – theft (except motor vehicle) 
02 = Forcible rape 07 = Motor vehicle theft 
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03 = Robbery 09 = Arson 
04 = Aggravated assault  
08 = Other assaults  
 
In order to produce arrest rates, we aggregate the number of arrests for the above categories and 
divide the resulting number of arrests by the annual state-age-year population. The population 
data for that purpose are retrieved from the US Census population estimates. We scale our arrest 
rates by 1,000 in order to ease the interpretation of our results. 
 
A2. Micro Data on Incarceration 
 
The micro data on US incarceration comes from the US Census. We sample all males aged 16-39 
from the 5 percent IPUMS for the 1980, 1990 and 2000 Census and the 2008-2012 American 
Community Survey (ACS). We identify the institutionalized population using the Group Quarters 
(GQ) variable. The GQ variable consistently identifies the following categories: 
 
a) Non-group quarter households; 
b) Institutions (Correctional Institutions, Mental Institutions, Institutions for the elderly, 
handicapped and poor); 
c) Non-institutional group quarters (Military, College dormitory, rooming house, other). 
 
However, only in the 1980 IPUMS is the GQ variable detailed enough to uniquely identify those 
in correctional facilities. In subsequent Censuses (and the ACS), the institutionalized population 
includes the following categories: correctional facilities, nursing homes and mental hospitals, and 
juvenile institutions. However, the share of the total institutionalized population accounted for by 
those in correctional facilities is very high in our sample.  
 
Appendix Table A4 shows the institutionalized male population by GQ type and age. Note that 
this data comes from published aggregate Census reports that do break up the categories, though 
this is not available in the IPUMS data release. In 2000, for example, 95.3 percent of 
institutionalized males aged 18-39 where in correctional facilities. Two key points come from 
Table A4. First, incarcerated males aged less than 18 are much less well identified (since juvenile 
facilities are an important component for this group). We therefore restrict our analysis of the 
Census data to those aged 18-39. Second, the 1980 Census has a less tight correspondence 
between institutionalization and incarceration. Fortunately, this is the one Census that has the full 
GQ coding in the micro files, so as a robustness test we use only the correctional facility 
definition in the 1980 Census. In the main specification we prefer to use the broader 
institutionalized measure across all years to maintain consistency. This approach is the same as 
that used by Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2010). 
 
A3. Entry Unemployment Rates 
 
We assume the age of labor market entry to be 16 to 18 for the whole sample. The year-of-birth 
cohorts in both the Census and the UCR samples run from 1941 to 1994: The first year of 
observation is 1980 with the oldest cohort aged 39, i.e. born in 1941. The last year of observation 
is 2010 with the youngest cohort aged 16, i.e. born in 1994. As we want to measure 
unemployment rates in the year of labor market entry, we consider unemployment rates from 
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1957 to 2010, covering the calendar years of each cohort in the sample at age 16-18. We use data 
on state-level annual insured unemployment rates from 1957 until 2010. The data are available 
from the Unemployment Insurance Financial Data Handbook provided by the US Department of 
Labor, Employment & Training Administration on their website. Unfortunately, that kind of data 
does not allow us to disaggregate entry unemployment rates by age, nor to provide measures of 
the duration of unemployment. As an alternative, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides 
state level unemployment rates based on the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1977 
onwards, to which we data read from the graphs in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) back to 
1963. This robustness check yields very similar results to the use of insured unemployment rates. 
 
B. United Kingdom 
 
B1. Panel Data on Convictions 
 
Crime data for the UK panel come from the Offenders Index Database (OID) and the Police 
National Computer (PNC). The measure of crime is convictions. The OID is a 4-week sample of 
all convictions in all courts across England and Wales, with the sample weeks evenly spread 
across the year. The data contains a unique personal identifier to allow us to remove multiple 
convictions for the same individual (i.e. in a given year an individual is either convicted or not) 
and provides data on gender, date of birth, region of conviction (10 regions) and offence 
category. This data sample runs from 1980 to 2002. From 2003 to 2010, the OID has been 
superseded by the PNC. We do not have access to the micro data of the PNC, but the Ministry of 
Justice have provided us with an extract of the number of individuals convicted in each year, 
broken down by individual year of age, gender, region of conviction and offence category. This 
allows us to merge the two datasets together to produce a panel covering the years 1980 to 2010. 
The PNC data is actually provided for the period 2000-2010 which allows us to examine the 
overlap between the OID and PNC in 2000-2002. Our analysis of this overlap suggests a very 
high concordance between the two sources. We obtain the number of convictions for property 
and violent crimes by aggregating convictions over crime types. As such, our measure for 
property crime includes burglary, theft and handling of stolen goods and criminal damage, while 
our measure for violent crime includes violence against the person, sexual offences and robbery. 
We produce conviction rates by dividing the number of convictions by the annual population in 
the observational unit (year-of-birth by region cell), and scale by 1,000. Population data are taken 
from the ONS population estimates.  As with the US data, the sample covers convictions from 
1980 to 2010 for 16-39 year-old males. Individual year-of-birth cohorts again therefore run from 
1941 until 1994.  
 
B2. Micro Data on Arrests 
 
The micro-level data for the UK comes from the British Crime Survey (BCS). The BCS is a large 
(around 45,000 individuals) annual cross-section survey used to construct measures of crime 
victimization. It is nationally representative and contains extensive personal demographics. From 
2001 onward, a sub-sample of respondents complete a supplementary survey that, among other 
things, covers contact with law enforcement agencies. In particular, respondents are asked 
whether they have ever been arrested by the police. There is however no information on the type 
of crime for which they were arrested nor on the eventual outcome. In addition there is no 
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information on when the arrest occurred, i.e. a 65-year old may have been arrested last week or 
50 years ago. We sample all males aged 16-65 and allocate the entry unemployment rate (see 
below) based on current region of residence and year of reaching 16 years old.   
 
B3. Entry Unemployment Rates 
 
Year of labor market entry is assumed to be 15 for those leaving school by 1972 and 16 for those 
leaving from 1973 onward to reflect the change in compulsory school leaving age introduced in 
the UK in 1973. Entry unemployment rates are measured at both the national and regional level. 
The male unemployment rate data from 1975 onwards comes from the Labour Force Survey 
(equivalent to the CPS). Prior to 1975 the unemployment rate is derived from the claimant count 
data. This latter measure covers only those registered as unemployed and is therefore a more 
narrow definition than that in the Labour Force Survey (which covers all those actively seeking 
employment in the previous two weeks). However our unemployment rate is only measured for 
males and the discrepancy between the two alternative measures was small prior to the 1980s. 
